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Torture in the Living Room
M. Angela Buenaventura1
INTRODUCTION
The prohibition against torture has become a jus cogens of international
law.2 In other words, the prohibition is considered binding on all states,
even in times of emergency,3 and regardless of a state’s signing of a
convention or actually practicing in accordance with the norm.4
Domestically, the United States has signed treaties prohibiting torture and
also has enacted federal statutes that prohibit torture. Despite these
prohibitions, the “torture memos”5 and the leaked photos displaying the
treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison have shown that the current
administration is indeed responsible for acts of torture.
As images of cruel and degrading prisoner treatment—some of which
rises to the level of torture—have emerged, and evidence of the current
administration’s acceptance of such interrogation techniques has made its
way into the public arena, fictional portrayals of torture on television
programs have become more prevalent. In this article, I will explore the
effects that fictional portrayals of torture have on the torture debate in
America. By focusing on the portrayal of torture and other coercive
interrogation techniques on the television program 24—a serial drama in
which torture methods are tools of the trade for an agent with the fictional
Counter Terrorist Unit of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—I will
argue that inaccurate fictional portrayals of torture on television mislead the
American public as to the true nature of torture, thereby obscuring the
public debate and diminishing the public pressure to hold those guilty of
torture accountable.
I will begin in Part I by briefly addressing the current laws and treaties
that proscribe the use of torture. Part II outlines the current public debate
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on torture, while Part III considers how fictional portrayals of torture on
television affect this national debate. Drawing on critiques of the “ticking
time bomb” hypothetical by David Luban and Elaine Scarry, as well as
Susan Sontag’s theories about how the public responds to images of war
and atrocity, I will analyze the ways in which fictional portrayals of torture
on shows like 24 shape the public debate on torture. Part IV will explore
specifically how the television drama 24 fits into and influences that debate.
Next, in Part V, I will discuss why having a substantive, realistic public
debate on torture is so important. Finally, in Part VI, I will propose several
means, including possible remedies and responses, to counteract the
detrimental effect fictional portrayals of torture have on any productive
torture debate.

I. LAW PROHIBITING TORTURE
As previously stated, the prohibition against torture has become a jus
cogens of international law. Moreover, the United States has signed treaties
that make torture illegal, and under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, “all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”6 First, the United States
ratified the Third Geneva Convention, the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War,7 in July 1955.8 The Third Geneva
Convention provides that prisoners of war “must at all times be humanely
treated”9 and that “no physical or mental torture, nor any other form of
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them
information of any kind whatever.”10
The United States also ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention, the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War,
in July 1955.11 Although this treaty has limited applicability because it only
comes into force during times of war or occupation, it created a new
category of international offenses, which it labeled grave breaches.12
According to Article 147, grave breaches include:
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willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces
of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.13
In 1994 the United States ratified the Convention Against Torture
(CAT).14 The treaty came into force when the U.S. Congress passed
implementing legislation in 1998.15 Article 2 of the CAT provides:
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any
territory under its jurisdiction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of
war or a threat of war, internal political in stability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be
invoked as a justification of torture.16
Thus, torture is prohibited by the CAT under all circumstances.
Furthermore, some scholars argue that the U.S. Constitution itself
prohibits torture.17 For example, the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment,18 and the Fifth Amendment provides that life, liberty,
and property shall not be taken without due process of law.19
Federal statutes and military codes also prohibit torture: 18 U.S.C. § 2340
imposes U.S. criminal liability on any individual who commits an act of
torture anywhere in the world,20 and 28 U.S.C. § 1350 establishes civil
liability for acts of torture.21 Finally, the Uniform Code of Military Justice
makes cruelty, oppression, or maltreatment of prisoners by U.S. forces a
crime.22
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II. THE CURRENT DEBATE ON TORTURE
A. The Ticking Time Bomb
Although torture is unquestionably illegal, the debate persists on whether
or not torture is justified under certain circumstances. The focal point of the
debate about torture is the ticking time bomb hypothetical. Although the
hypothetical may be worded slightly differently in different contexts, the
general dilemma is as follows: A bomb threatens countless lives and a
suspect refuses to disclose information that might prevent or reduce the
potential damage from an explosion. Do you torture the suspect in order to
obtain information that could save countless lives? David Luban has noted
that the ticking time bomb hypothetical has become the “alpha and omega
of our thinking about torture.”23 Luban stated, “Everyone argues the pros
and cons of torture through the ticking time bomb. Senator Schumer and
Professor Dershowitz, the Israeli Supreme Court, and indeed every
journalist devoting a think-piece to the unpleasant question of torture,
begins with the ticking time bomb and ends there as well.”24
B. Dershowitz
One of the most well-known analyses of the acceptability of torture,
which focuses on the ticking time bomb scenario, is Alan Dershowitz’s
book Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the
Challenge.25 In his book, Dershowitz explores the possibility of striking a
balance between national security and civil liberties through the use of
torture warrants.26 A torture warrant is judicial permission to utilize a nonlethal method of torture (such as “[inserting] a sterilized needle . . . under
the fingernails [of a suspect] to produce unbearable pain without any threat
to health or life . . . .”27) to obtain information from the suspect.28 Law
enforcement officials would be able to obtain a judicial warrant from a court
that would allow them to torture a suspected terrorist.29
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Dershowitz argues that torture warrants would minimize the use of
torture against terrorist suspects for several reasons.30 First, judges would
only grant warrants when presented with compelling reasons, so the amount
of physical violence against terrorist suspects would decrease.31 Dershowitz
states:
[A]t the most obvious level, a double check is always more
protective than a single check . . . . Requiring the decision [to
torture a suspect] to be approved by a judicial officer will result in
fewer instances of torture even if the judge rarely turns down a
request.32
Second, torture warrants would give suspects one more opportunity to
testify before being subjected to torture.33
Dershowitz further argues that torture warrants would bring the debate on
torture out into the open.34 He contends that integrating torture into the
legal system through the use of judicial warrants is preferable to allowing
torture to occur “ad hoc, off-the-books, and under-the-radar-screen.”35
Torture warrants would make officials publicly accountable for their
actions, and torture could be confronted in a candid way rather than
ignoring the problem or pretending that only a few bad apples are
responsible.36 Dershowitz states that “in a democracy it is always
preferable to decide controversial issues in advance, rather than in the heat
of battle.”37
Moreover, Dershowitz argues that torture warrants would better protect
the rights of the suspect. He states that a suspect “would be granted
immunity, told that he was now compelled to testify, threatened with
imprisonment if he refused to do so, and given the option of providing the
requested information.”38 If the suspect refused to provide information, he
would be threatened with torture. Thus, the suspect would be more willing
to provide the information since the use of torture had been authorized by
law.39
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C. Criticisms of the Ticking Time Bomb and Refutations of Dershowitz
Although the ticking time bomb and, by extension, Dershowitz’s torture
warrants have become the “alpha and omega” of the torture debate, several
notable scholars—including David Luban, Elaine Scarry, and Richard
Posner—have denied the practicality of focusing on the ticking time bomb
hypothetical and have refuted Dershowitz’s rationale for torture warrants.
1. Luban
David Luban argues that the ticking time bomb hypothetical has become
the “alpha and omega of our thinking about torture,” not because the
scenario is likely to play out in real life, but in order to sway those who
believe in an absolute prohibition on torture.40 In other words, once this
extreme and improbable hypothetical convinces a torture prohibitionist that
her moral principles can be breached under certain circumstances and she
can no longer claim moral high ground, all that is left is deciding which
scenarios justify torture.41 In addition, the ticking time bomb serves a
second rhetorical goal of painting the torturer in a different light—the
torturer becomes a heroic public servant out to save lives rather than a cruel
sadist.42 In this way, torture is divorced from cruelty and becomes more
palatable.43
Luban warns that in a world of imperfect information, the ticking time
bomb “bewitches us” and distracts us from the real debate.44 He notes,
“The ticking-bomb scenario cheats its way around difficulties by stipulating
that the bomb is there, ticking away, and that officials know it and know
they have the man who planted it. Those conditions will seldom be met.” 45
In reality, al Qaeda suspects will almost never be interrogated to find out
where a bomb is hidden, but rather to add to a body of intelligence that
might later “unwind” a terrorist organization.46 Rather than evaluate the
merits of torture through the black and white lens of the ticking time bomb
scenario, Luban suggests we ask ourselves more complex and realistic
questions. For example, how does the chance that a suspect has vital
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information affect a decision to torture?47 Does a suspect’s refusal to talk
after being tortured mean it is time to stop or time to ramp up the level of
torture?48 Finally, “must a citizen . . . unblinkingly think the unthinkable
and accept that the morality of torture should be decided purely by totaling
up costs and benefits[?]”49 At a time when the United States is undertaking
an endless war on terror and the administration would have us believe that a
permanent emergency exists, it is dangerous to assume that torture can be
neatly confined to exceptional ticking time bomb cases.50
In addition to deconstructing the absurdity of a situation where a wouldbe torturer has perfect information and perfect certainty, Luban makes the
salient point that any discussion of the ticking time bomb hypothetical
focuses only on discrete instances of torture for emergency’s sake,
distracting from any discussion of the possibility that we are condoning
organized torture and a culture of torture.51 He notes, “The real world is a
world of policies, guidelines, and directives. It is a world of practices, not
of ad hoc emergency measures.”52 He further notes that one can reasonably
infer that the administration’s recent efforts to defend its actions
demonstrate that a torture culture is firmly in place despite official
condemnation of it.53
Moreover, Luban finds fault in Dershowitz’s assertion that warrants
would make the torture of suspects less likely.54 Noting that Jay S.
Bybee—who, in August 2002, signed the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
memo interpreting U.S. laws so as to permit torture (“the Bybee
memo”)55—is now a federal judge,56 Luban asserts that because politicians
pick judges, if politicians accept torture, then judges will similarly accept
torture.57 Thus, “once we create a torture culture, only the naïve would
suppose that judges will provide a safeguard. Judges do not fight their
culture—they reflect it.”58
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2. Scarry
In her essay “Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz,” Elaine
Scarry outlines similar contentions with Dershowitz’s reasoning in
particular and the ticking time bomb hypothetical in general. Like Luban,
Scarry explains the improbability of having perfect information about a
suspect’s guilt and a bomb’s reality.59 She, too, argues that introducing a
hypothetical occasion for torture that bears no resemblance to “the
thousands of cases that actually occur” merely serves to “change torture into
a sanctionable act.”60
Scarry also echoes Luban’s doubt that torture warrants would decrease
the incidence of torture,61 noting that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA)62 has declined only one requested warrant in twenty-five
years.63 Moreover, she argues that there is no reason to believe that people
who are willing to breach our current prohibition on torture would obey
court orders if a torture warrant were denied.64 Scarry additionally argues
that, contrary to Dershowitz’s assertion, torture warrants would not make
officials publicly accountable for their actions since obtaining a warrant
would actually release a torturer from liability.65 Finally, Scarry points out
that warrants most likely would not allow us to review torturers’ actions,
noting that our “[l]ong experience with search warrants suggests [that] . . .
far from facilitating review, [they have] historically . . . tended to close the
door on review.”66
3. Posner
Although Judge Posner has expressed approval of Dershowitz’s
reasoning that civil liberties may need to be curtailed in times of
endangered public safety, he has expressed strong disapproval of
Dershowitz’s torture warrant proposal. 67 First, Posner doubts that torture
warrants would provide a check on executive discretion.68 He notes that
judicial officers authorized to issue warrants would be selected at least
partially for their sensitivity to security concerns. 69 In addition, because
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warrants are issued in ex parte proceedings, law enforcement officers can
forum shop for judges or magistrates who are likely to approve the
warrants.70
Second, Posner refutes Dershowitz’s claim that warrants would
demystify torture practice and encourage public debate because warrants
and the reasons for granting them would most likely be kept secret.71
Posner disagrees with Dershowitz’s proposal that screening would make
law enforcement officials seeking warrants more candid and would provide
a significant check against government use of torture, arguing that “[t]he
requirement of a warrant would no doubt make the [law enforcement]
officers seeking them a little more careful, but perhaps not much more
truthful or candid.”72
Moreover, Posner has expressed strong concerns about legitimizing the
practice of torture through torture warrants.73 Instead, Posner believes that
interrogation techniques that may qualify as torture should remain illegal
technically, but should be permitted in “extreme circumstances.”74 He
argues that if courts declare that certain highly coercive interrogation
techniques are acceptable in certain circumstances, officers will explore the
outer bounds of the rule.75 In addition, Posner argues that subjecting
something immoral and customarily prohibited to the controls of the legal
process will legitimize it.76 Posner believes that it would be better “to leave
in place the customary legal prohibitions, but with the understanding that of
course they will not be enforced in extreme circumstances.”77 Furthermore,
Posner notes that “requiring a warrant in cases of coercive interrogation
would operate merely to whitewash questionable practices by persuading
the naive that there was firm judicial control over such interrogations.”78
In summary, the current debate on torture can be characterized generally
as follows: Those who believe torture should be allowed under certain
circumstances tend to focus on a cost-benefit analysis and the ticking time
bomb situation, reasoning that the cost of curtailing civil liberties in times
of imminent danger is outweighed by the benefit of saving innocent
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civilians through the use of torture. Those who would prohibit torture
believe that the ticking time bomb hypothetical is an unrealistic and
impractical method of assessing the issue, that the ticking time bomb
hypothetical obscures real issues, and that torture warrants will not reduce
the incidents of torture.

III. HOW FICTIONAL PORTRAYALS OF TORTURE CAN AFFECT THE
NATIONAL DEBATE
In order to understand how fictional portrayals of torture can affect the
public’s understanding of the reality of torture, it is first necessary to
examine how images of actual torture can influence citizen action. An
analysis by cultural commentator Susan Sontag and the public reaction to
the photographs of abuse at the Abu Ghraib detention center show that
images play a substantial role in shaping public debate.
A. Sontag
In her book Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag explores how
images of atrocity have the power to shape viewers’ understanding of the
atrocities in a way that can incite them to act.79 She notes that the
photographs of the suffering of Vietnamese villagers and American
conscripts published by Life magazine starting in 1962 intensified protest
against the American presence in Vietnam.80 Sontag further notes that
although “[i]t takes some very peculiar circumstances for the war to become
genuinely unpopular. . . . When it does, the material gathered by
photographers, which they may think of as unmasking the conflict, is of
great use.”81
However, Sontag also acknowledges the limitations and dangers of
communicating to the public through pictures.82 She stresses that pictures
serve to mobilize people to act on their own preexisting beliefs rather than
giving them pause to question them.83 She notes that it is “the whims and
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loyalties of the diverse communities” that determine the meaning of
photographs, not the photographer’s intentions.”84 Sontag writes:
Images of dead civilians and smashed houses may serve to quicken
the hatred of the foe, as did the hourly re-runs by Al Jazeera, the
Arab satellite television network based in Qatar . . . . Incendiary as
that footage was to the many who watch Al Jazeera throughout the
world, it did not tell them anything about the Israeli army they
were not already primed to believe. In contrast, images offering
evidence that contradicts cherished pieties are invariably dismissed
as having been staged for the camera.85
Sontag also notes that pictures can be dangerous because they lead to
oversimplified conceptions of reality. Although “[t]he understanding of
war among people who have not experienced war is now chiefly a product
of the impact of . . . images,”86 this understanding is dangerous because
photographs are easily recalled overgeneralizations, “like a quotation, or a
maxim or proverb.”87
Furthermore, Sontag points out that photographs of atrocities are
unreliable because military authorities often censor war photography in
order to maintain public support and morale.88 She notes:
What the American military promoted during the Gulf War in 1991
were images of the techno war . . . that illustrated America’s
absolute military superiority over its enemy. American television
viewers weren’t allowed to see footage acquired by NBC . . . of
what that superiority could wreak: the fate of thousands of Iraqi
conscripts who . . . were carpet bombed with explosives, napalm,
radioactive DU rounds, and cluster bombs . . . .89
Sontag is not alone in her fear that pictures are manipulated to advance an
agenda. Citing the combination of accreditation and daily briefings in
Vietnam, the selected press pools and video briefings in the Persian Gulf
War of 1990–91, and the Pentagon’s strategy of embedding reporters and
their camera crews with fighting units in the most recent war in Iraq, one
commentator has noted that during the post–World War II period, neither
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the U.S. nor the U.K. military has operated without detailed media
management procedures designed to influence pictorial outcomes.90 More
recently, both the U.S. media and Al Jazeera have used images to
manipulate public opinion about the war in Iraq.91 While Al Jazeera airs
footage of “‘blown-out brains, the blood-splattered pavements, [and]
screaming infants,”92 the U.S. media closes its eyes to civilian casualties
and airs interviews of the families of American military serving in Iraq.93
In summary, visual representations of torture can influence the national
debate because they can incite political action (given the proper context),
can become easily recalled overgeneralizations of a controversial situation,
and can be manipulated by the government to create a desired perception of
events.
B. Abu Ghraib Photos, 2004 and 2006
The public’s reaction to the Abu Ghraib photos also supports the notion
that pictures can lead to political action. Although written accounts of
prisoner mistreatment existed before these pictures became public,94 there
was no substantial public outcry until the pictures of American soldiers
tormenting Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib were published on April 28, 2004.
After the pictures were leaked, the Bush administration and its lawyers
worked to prevent the release of any more photographs or videotapes.95
Thus, the outrage resulting from the pictures led to political action, albeit
action to conceal mistreatment. As mentioned previously and discussed in
detail in Part V below, the DOJ’s repudiation of its earlier analysis of the
definition of torture and a legislative amendment prohibiting torture can be
accredited to widespread public criticism after the Abu Ghraib scandal.96
Indeed, in 2006, when Judge Alvin Hellerstein ordered the release of
additional Abu Ghraib photographs after the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit against
the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in October 2003, 97 his opinion
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reflected a strong belief in the power of pictures to inform the public and
incite political action.
Publication of the photographs is central to the purposes of FOIA for two
main reasons. First, it initiates debate about the improper and unlawful
conduct of American soldiers—“rogue” soldiers, as they have been
characterized. Second, it raises other important questions such as whether
supervisory failures in the chain of command may make commanding
officers culpable in addition to the soldiers who were already courtmartialed for perpetrating the wrongs.98
Although the government planned to appeal the decision, it abandoned
the appeal and agreed to release the disputed pictures.99 In a filing to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, government lawyers
cited Salon.com’s publication of an official army criminal archive that
included many, if not all, of the disputed images as the reason for dropping
their legal fight.100 In Salon.com’s February 16, 2006, statement explaining
why they released the photos, the editors echoed both Sontag’s and Judge
Hellerstein’s belief in the power of pictures to inform the public and incite
political action, stating: “The . . . reason for publishing these pictures is that
the system itself broke down over Abu Ghraib. . . . After an initial flurry of
outrage, the Republican-controlled Congress lost interest in investigating
whether senior military officers—and even Pentagon officials—created a
climate in which torture (yes, torture) flourished.”101
Government actions to control the messages sent to the public by pictures
of conflicts, as well as the commentary provided by organizations such as
the ACLU and Salon.com explaining their efforts to release pictures of
torture and atrocity, corroborate Sontag’s theory that pictures have the
power to shape the public’s perception and incite political action.
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IV. 24: A CASE STUDY ON THE NATIONAL DEBATE AND FICTIONAL
PORTRAYALS OF TORTURE
As detailed above, real-life images of torture have the power to shape
national debate and political action. That power is not diminished when the
images are fictional. In this section, I will explore how fictional portrayals
of torture can shape the torture debate and incite political action by focusing
on the popular television show 24.
A. An Overview of 24
24, a U.S. television series broadcast by the Fox Broadcasting Company
(Fox),102 premiered on November 6, 2001, and continues to be aired in
forty-five countries worldwide.103 The main character, Jack Bauer, is the
head of an elite team of CIA agents known as the Counter Terrorist Unit
(CTU).104 The show also features Jack’s colleagues at the CTU, an
assortment of terrorists, and important political figures such as senators and
the President.105
In this concept drama, each season takes place within one twenty-fourhour period.106 The sense of urgency created by this framework is
emphasized by a ticking digital clock that appears on-screen throughout the
show.107 As one commentator has noted, the main characters of this
program are not Jack Bauer and President David Palmer; they are the
minute and the second: “Emblazoned on the screen at irregular intervals is a
digital clock that marks off the passing seconds, and every time we see it,
our anxiety ratchets up a notch.”108 Also adding to the sense of excitement
and urgency are the rapid scene changes between different locations, which
follow the parallel adventures of different characters tied together by the
central plot.
The formula for each season remains, for the most part, static: there is a
central threat to the United States that Jack Bauer and the CTU must stop
before countless lives are lost. Throughout each episode, another dramatic
layer is added to the show as Jack experiences a series of personal problems
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that are integrated into the main plot. For example, in season one, the main
plot involved Jack Bauer and other CTU agents attempting to stop a group
of terrorists trying to kill presidential candidate David Palmer.109 In a
subplot, a mole inside the CTU is exposed.110 Tying the plot to Jack’s
personal life, the terrorists attempt to assassinate Palmer—with whom Jack
is friends—and capture Jack’s family.111
One notable characteristic of the show is the frequent portrayal of torture,
usually utilized to obtain information from a suspect. As one commentator
notes: “On 24, torture is less an unfortunate last resort than an
epistemology. Whenever an urgent or sticky question of fact arises,
someone—bad guy or good guy, terrorist or counterterror agent; it doesn’t
matter—automatically sparks up the electrodes or starts filling syringes with
seizure juice.”112 Examples abound. In season one, when a suspected mole
named Jamey Farrell will not talk, CTU agents brings her to their
headquarters and threaten to harm her.113 In the same “day,” Jack Bauer
rams a kidnapping suspect in the chest with the back end of a knife. As the
suspect begins to have a heart attack, Jack holds the suspect’s heart pills in
his hand, claiming he’ll hand them over after he gets the information he
wants.114
Later seasons continue the tradition of showing torture under similarly
urgent circumstances. In season two, Jack Bauer shows a suspected
terrorist a video monitor linked to a live satellite of the suspect’s family in
captivity.115 As he threatens to kill the suspect’s family if the suspect does
not talk, Jack fakes a shooting of the suspect’s oldest son on the monitor,
and the suspect gives Jack the desired information.116 In season three, Nina
Myers, Jack Bauer’s ex-girlfriend and former CTU agent-turned-mole, is
interrogated by a CTU torture expert to extract information about a deadly
biological weapon.117 When she refuses to talk, the interrogator sticks a
needle into her carotid artery.118
In the first episode of season four, Jack Bauer breaks into an interrogation
room, shoots a captured terrorist in the kneecap, and threatens to shoot him
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again if he does not give up the information Jack needs.119 Later in season
four, when CTU agents suspect that the secretary of defense’s son knows
something about his father’s kidnapping, they subject him to sensory
deprivation.120 In the same season, a CTU analyst is suspected of being a
mole and is immediately brought into the interrogation room for a tasering
session.121 Later in the season, after Jack Bauer and other CTU agents
break into a hotel room to arrest a suspected terrorist’s wife who has been
shot, one of the agents grinds his thumb into the wife’s gunshot wound and
tells her that she must give up information about her husband if she wants
the pain to stop.122 During the first episode of season five, Jack Bauer
interrogates the critically wounded leader of a team of assassins, promising
medical attention if he cooperates.123 Later in season five, Audrey Raines,
an inter-agency liaison for the DOD, is implicated in ongoing terrorist
attacks. 124 She is soon cleared of wrongdoing, but not before being
subjected to torture involving Sodium Pentothal.125
24 has become a water cooler show. According to Nielsen ratings for the
week of Tuesday, April 18, 2006, 12.5 million Americans watched 24.126 It
also has received critical acclaim.127 Kiefer Sutherland, who plays Jack
Bauer and also executive produces the show, won a Golden Globe for his
performance,128 and the creators of the show, Joel Surnow and Robert
Cochran, won an Emmy Award.129 24 also won the Golden Globe for Best
Drama Series in 2004.130
Although the show deals with timely issues such as terrorism and the use
of torture, individuals involved in the making of 24 perceive the show
purely as fictional rather than an attempt to portray real-life events or to
argue for or against the use of torture in real life. In an interview with
Charlie Rose, Kiefer Sutherland stated: “Do I personally believe that the
police or any of these other legal agencies that are working for this
government should be entitled to interrogate people and do the things that I
do on the show? No, I do not.”131 In addition, Bob Cochran, the co-creator
of 24, noted that even when government characters torture suspects, they do
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so in theoretically ideal circumstances: “The terrorist really has the code,
the bomb is really ticking.”132 He added that “[i]n real life, you don’t have
that certainty.”133
B. Is 24 Beneficial or Detrimental to the Debate on Torture?
Given the power of the visual image to shape public debate, it is worth
examining whether the portrayals of torture on 24 accurately reflect the
real-life context in which torture occurs. In this section, I will analyze both
the positive and negative contributions 24 makes to the debate, concluding
that the ticking time bomb scenario played out on television works to
perpetuate the false debate that currently exists, which ultimately does a
disservice to a substantive dialogue on torture.
1. Beneficial Effects of 24 on the Torture Debate
Because torture on 24 is depicted in a clear and disturbing manner, it
could be seen as a tool for awakening public discourse. For this reason,
Amnesty International has stated that the show is “educational.”134 There
may be something to this endorsement. After all, one of the ways the Bush
administration has sought to evade laws prohibiting torture is through
creative interpretation of the letter of the law.135 In order to consider what
should fall within the ambit of torture and should thus be prohibited, the
public must first become familiar with terms such as “waterboarding”
(simulated drowning) and Sodium Pentothal. Use of these methods to
extract information from suspects on 24 may serve to inform the debate on
whether this conduct constitutes torture.
For example, the current administration has attempted to narrow the
definition of torture to exclude acts that should fall within the ambit of
“torture.”136 In the “torture memos,” which were meant to define torture in
the context of interrogations conducted outside the United States against
enemy combatants,137 the administration attempted to narrow the definition
of torture so drastically that acts such as waterboarding would not qualify as
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torture.138 As mentioned previously, in the August 2002 Bybee memo, the
DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) tried to restrict the definition of
torture to those acts resulting in “serious physical injury, such as organ
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.”139 Similarly, after
CBS’s 60 Minutes II aired leaked photographs of prisoners in humiliating
poses taken at Abu Ghraib,140 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld alleged
that the pictures—which included scenes of U.S. military personnel forcing
nude Iraqi prisoners to simulate sex acts, a man badly beaten, and a
corpse141—portrayed abuse, not torture.142
The current administration has also creatively interpreted international
treaties to exclude certain persons from the protection of laws prohibiting
torture.143 The DOJ concluded in the torture memos that the CAT “may be
unconstitutional if applied to interrogations” conducted by the United States
in the course of the “war against al Qaeda and its allies,” and that “necessity
or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might” violate the
statute.144 Furthermore, the Bush administration has sought to prevent the
Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
from being applied to individuals detained at Guatanamo by declining to
designate them as prisoners of war.145
Television programs such as 24, which portray torture techniques in a
graphic manner, may be useful in encouraging public discourse and
meditation about the boundaries of torture. As Karen J. Greenberg,
Executive Director of the Center on Law and Security, notes, “[O]nce we
understand and define what legal coercive interrogation is, we can perhaps
separate it from torture.”146 A similar sentiment regarding the importance
of defining the boundaries of torture was evident during Alberto Gonzales’s
Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearing. During his hearing,
Gonzales stated, “[T]he agencies wanted to be sure that they would not do
anything that would violate our legal obligations. And so they did the right
thing: they asked questions. What is lawful conduct? Because we don’t
want to do anything that violates the law.”147

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

Torture in the Living Room 121

When the American public sees what the administration would consider
“coercive interrogation techniques” on 24, they are encouraged to consider
whether such physically and psychologically punishing techniques (which
appear both on the show and in real life interrogations at Guantánamo and
Abu Ghraib) qualify as torture. Public meditation on the boundaries of
torture—as the public outcry after the release of the Abu Ghraib photos
shows—is crucial in preventing the administration from narrowing the
definition of torture. This type of meditation can be encouraged through
fictional portrayals of torture on programs such as 24.
2. Detrimental Effects of 24 on the Torture Debate
Despite the assertion that fictional portrayals of torture on 24 may
educate the public as to what various torture techniques look like, such
portrayals ultimately do more harm than good when it comes to informing
the public and shaping the debate on torture. The depictions of torture on
24 are problematic because the images are grounded in the unrealistic
ticking time bomb scenario. Without providing viewers with an accurate
context, any information gained from viewing the fictional portrayal of
torture is flawed and detrimental to the public debate.
First, as discussed above, Sontag notes that pictures serve to mobilize
people to act on their preexisting tendencies and beliefs rather than to give
them pause to question their beliefs.148 When new Abu Ghraib photos were
released worldwide in 2006, the vast difference between the response of
Americans and the response abroad demonstrated that viewers’ community,
loyalties, and perspectives shaped their reactions to pictures. These new
Abu Ghraib photos, which included “those of a man whose throat had
apparently been slit, a group of men being forced to masturbate in front of
guards, photographs of bloodied Iraqis who had been shot, and prisoners
with burns and weeping wounds,”149 showed up on Australian television
first,150 then on networks across the Middle East,151 then in the U.S. on
Salon.com.152 As one commentator noted, the photos “[did] not get much
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attention in the United States, but [are] drawing expressions of disgust and
outrage abroad,”153 where they have reawakened bitter memories of the Abu
Ghraib scandal.154
Therefore, even if people view photographs of an atrocity, they will not
be mobilized against the atrocity unless preexisting tendencies and beliefs
predispose them to protest the atrocity. Thus, viewing realistic portrayals of
horrific torture techniques on shows such as 24 can do nothing on its own.
Though a person might learn what waterboarding is, merely viewing a
portrayal of somebody being subjected to this type of torture may not incite
action.
Second, 24 poses the same dangers as the ticking time bomb
hypothetical. Namely, both 24 and the ticking time bomb hypothetical
work to transform the torturer into a heroic public servant and distract the
public from the real issues. 24 thus works to perpetuate the artificial debate
on torture that currently exists. In the ticking time bomb hypothetical, the
torturer is not someone who enjoys inflicting pain, but rather is a person
who must do something he despises in order to save millions of people.
Similarly on 24, the hero of the show, Jack Bauer, is the torturer. By
focusing on Jack’s personal life and integrating it into the show’s main
story lines, 24 humanizes the torturer. As one 24 fan at the Washington
Post has noted, “If you’re addicted to Fox’s ‘24,’ you probably cheered on
Jack Bauer when, in a recent episode, he snapped the fingers of a suspect
who was, shall we say, reluctant to talk. . . . Torture’s a no-brainer here.
Jack’s got to save us all from imminent thermonuclear annihilation.”155
Thus, like the omnipresent ticking time bomb scenario, 24 turns the torturer
into a hero, divorcing torture from cruelty.
In reality, as Luban has noted, interrogators who are trained to torture
become “inured to levels of violence and pain that would make ordinary
people vomit at the sight.”156 Luban further notes that, historically,
individuals trained to torture begin to run amok. He cites both a 1999 Israel
Supreme Court decision concerning interrogators needlessly torturing two-
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thirds of their Palestinian captives and the fact that during the Argentinian
Dirty War, torturers were initially hesitant to inflict torture but by the end
had become hardened young officers who placed bets on who could kidnap
the prettiest girl to rape and torture.157 Thus, the fictional image of tortureras-hero is incompatible with the reality of those who commit torture.
In addition, 24 ignores the same issues that the current debate on torture
neglects to incorporate. As mentioned previously, the ticking time bomb
scenario distracts the public from debating the important questions such as
whether the chance that a suspect has vital information affects the decision
to torture, whether refusal to talk after torture means it is time to stop or
time to ramp up the level of torture, and whether the morality of torture
should be decided by totaling up costs and benefits.158 On 24, the majority
of the instances of tortures are the result of Jack Bauer’s need to extract
information from a suspect as quickly as possible in order to save millions
of lives:
For 24’s producers, in their fourth season of constructing a savethe-world scenario that must be completed in one day, the use of
torture is about ‘real-time’ drama, not politics. “It goes with the 24
conceit that we need information and don’t have days to break this
person. Sometimes we don’t even have hours.”159
Thus, while scenarios are crafted to fit the format of a television program
when problems must be solved in twenty-four hours, they greatly distort the
context in which torture takes place. As one commentator has noted: “Real
intelligence gathering is not a made-for-TV melodrama. It consists of
acquiring countless bits of information and piecing together a mosaic. So
the most urgent question has nothing to do with torture and ticking
bombs.”160
24 also cheats its way around complex issues by concealing the
consequences of torture. Although the torture techniques used and
immediate pain caused by torture are realistically portrayed on 24, the
context in which torture is used and the long-term costs of torture are highly
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unrealistic. For example, in one episode, after two CTU employees are
shown being tortured because the rest of the CTU erroneously believes that
they are moles, both subsequently return to work and lead normal lives.161
In reality, torture survivors suffer for the rest of their lives. As the Center
for Victims of Torture notes, “Psychological symptoms of torture frequently
include anxiety, depression, irritability, paranoia, guilt, suspiciousness,
sexual dysfunction, loss of concentration, confusion, insomnia, nightmares,
impaired memory, and memory loss.”162 For example, since Diana Ortiz, a
Catholic missionary from a Kentucky convent who was working with the
poor in Guatemala, was kidnapped in 1989 and tortured, her life has never
been the same.163 Although Ortiz was held for only twenty-four hours, she
suffered a complete loss of memory of everything in her life prior to being
tortured.164 After her release, Ortiz no longer recognized her own
parents.165 Years later, Ortiz still has no memory of her childhood, her
college years, or her pretorture friendships.166 In short, in both the ticking
time bomb hypothetical and 24, the consequences of torture—the political
ramifications of violations of norms governing everyday society and the
shattering of every aspect of a victim’s well-being—are almost entirely
ignored. Thus, fictional portrayals of torture on shows such as 24 are
dangerous because viewers may assume that the context that gives rise to
torture on 24 and the political and long-term ramifications are as realistic as
the torture methods portrayed.
The fact that the consequences of torture are not revealed in fictional
portrayals such as 24 is also dangerous because engaging in a calculation of
consequences could greatly affect the public’s perception of the
acceptability of torture in times of emergency; 24 distorts the debate in such
a way that this calculation does not occur. A Newsweek poll on torture
found that 58 percent of people would support torture to thwart a terrorist
attack; however, when asked if they would still support the use of torture if
such use made it more likely that enemies would torture Americans, 57
percent said no.167
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In summary, on 24, torture is only carried out in emergency situations, it
almost always extracts the desired information, torture victims recover
seamlessly, and the torturer is a hero. This fictional portrayal of torture
becomes the “maxim” that viewers will recall when confronted with the
topic of torture. Like the ticking time bomb situation, which has
“bewitched” us and pulled the torture debate off course, 24’s format cheats
its way around important and complex issues, reinforcing the ticking-timebomb-centered public debate on torture, and causing its viewers to carry an
unrealistic portrait of torture in their minds.

V. WHY IS THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON TORTURE IMPORTANT?
Now that I have generally outlined the current debate on torture, the
question remains: Why is a public debate on torture important? As I noted
in Part I, torture is unquestionably illegal. However, a gap remains between
American torture laws and practices.
Incontrovertible evidence
demonstrates that U.S. forces have tortured prisoners at U.S. detention
centers in Guantánamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq.168 The ACLU
documented these incidents of torture in a report submitted to the United
Nations Committee Against Torture.169 In addition, in March 2006,
Pentagon officials issued a new rule stating that evidence obtained through
torture cannot be used by the special panels that review the cases of “enemy
combatants” being held at Guantánamo.170 The need for such a rule, despite
numerous laws prohibiting torture, illustrates the current gap between the
United States’ obligations not to torture and its actual policies and practices.
Thus, the public debate on torture is important because the American public
has the ability to pressure the government to close, or at least narrow, the
gap between the acts of U.S. citizens and the laws prohibiting torture.
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A. Effect Public Debate Can Have on the Interpretation of the Law
Governing Torture
Although international treaties prohibiting torture are guided by larger
political forces, the interpretation of these treaties is subject to public
opinion. One illustrative example of the effect public outcry can have on
the practical application of laws governing torture is the DOJ’s repudiation
of its earlier analysis of the definition of torture. As mentioned previously,
in the August 2002 Bybee memo, the OLC informed the White House that
the CAT only prohibits the most extreme interrogation techniques and that
under the anti-torture statute,171 in order for an act to qualify as torture, pain
endured as a result of the act “must be equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of
bodily function, or even death.”172 The memo also stated that the statute
“may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations” conducted by the
United States in the course of the “war against al Qaeda and its allies,” and
that “necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that
might” violate the statute.173 In addition, a March 6, 2003, draft report by
Pentagon lawyers defined torture in the narrowest of terms: “[E]ven if the
defendant [U.S. government agent] knows that severe pain will result from
his actions, if causing the harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite
specific intent even though the defendant did not act in good faith.”174
As a result of widespread public outcry, the OLC issued a December
2004 memo repudiating its earlier analysis of the definition of torture and
rejecting the absurdly high threshold for torture set forth in the Bybee
memo.175 As the Washington Post noted, “This second effort by the Bush
administration to parse the legal meaning of the word ‘torture’ was
provoked by the damaging political fallout from the disclosure this summer
of the first memo, drafted in August 2002 and criticized by human rights
lawyers and experts around the globe.”176
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B. Effect Public Debate Can Have on Legislation to Prevent Torture
Public outcry can also lead to the enactment of legislation that proscribes
torture. For example, in response to the public’s reaction to the Abu Ghraib
scandal, the Senate passed the McCain Amendment on October 5, 2005.177
As the Washington Post noted:
When the abuses by U.S. servicemen and intelligence officers at
Abu Ghraib surfaced last year, there was understandable outrage in
this country and abroad. . . . In response, Sen. John McCain,
himself a victim of brutal torture by the North Vietnamese,
introduced an amendment to the 2006 Defense Appropriations Act
that would, in essence, require all agencies of the U.S. government
to comply with the Geneva Conventions and international law,
which prohibit torture.178
This amendment prohibits the “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment” of any “individual in the custody or under the physical control
of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical
location,” and reiterates existing law, requiring that the DOD’s
interrogations conform to the U.S. Field Army Manual on Intelligence
Interrogation.179 The McCain Amendment also requires that persons under
U.S. control be accorded their Constitutional right to be free from “cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”180
Recognizing the power of public outcry, Amnesty International asks
visitors to its interactive Web page “Ten Things You Can Do to Stop
Torture and Indefinite Detention” to urge their representatives “to
cosponsor and pass H.R. 952, the ‘Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act’”
and to urge their senators “to cosponsor and pass S. 654, the ‘Convention
Against Torture Implementation Act,’ which address the practice of
‘extraordinary renditions’ (the U.S. practice of sending individuals to
countries with a record of torture, such as Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and
Egypt, for interrogation).”181
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C. Effect Public Debate Can Have on Confirmation Hearings
Confirmation hearings also allow the public to hold high-level officials
accountable for their actions. As the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia noted in Washington Legal Foundation v. Department of Justice,
“[t]hrough the confirmation process, the public, individuals, and interested
organizations alike have an opportunity to inform the decisionmaking
process and scrutinize the President’s nominee.”182 Because confirmation
hearings have become public spectacles, senators’ performance in these
hearings are subject to popular review.183 Thus, through senators, the public
can voice its concern about nominees’ stances on torture.
Recently, high-level officials have indeed been questioned about their
stance on torture at nomination hearings. Most notably, because his stance
on torture was the subject of complaints by Democrats and human rights
groups,184 Attorney General nominee Alberto R. Gonzales was questioned
heavily about torture policy during his 2004 Senate Judiciary Committee
confirmation hearing.185 For example, Senator Leahy read the definition of
torture from the Bybee memo and then asked Gonzales if he agreed with
that interpretation of torture back in August 2002.186
In addition, during Secretary of State nominee Condoleezza Rice’s
January 2005 Senate confirmation hearing, Democrats questioned Rice
about whether she considered certain extreme interrogation tactics to be
torture.187 Supreme Court nominee Samuel Alito was also questioned about
his stance on torture during his January 2006 confirmation hearing.188
Senator Graham asked Alito, “Do you believe that any president, because
we’re at war, could say, the statute on torture gets in the way of my ability
to defend the United States; therefore I don’t have to comply with it?”189
Thus, although high-level officials may not veer from prepared statements
at public confirmation hearings, the public has some opportunity to hold
them accountable for their stances on torture.
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D. Effect Public Debate Can Have on the Prosecution of Torturers
Public outcry could also lead to the prosecution of torturers, although this
route to preventing torture may be more difficult and indirect. There are
three separate routes to prosecute a torturer: (1) federal criminal
prosecution, (2) military prosecution, and (3) prosecution by the
international community. Federal criminal prosecution of a torturer could
be pursued under the War Crimes Act of 1996 (as amended in 1997),190
which authorizes federal prosecution of any U.S. national or member of the
U.S. armed forces who commits a war crime or of any third country
national who commits a war crime against a U.S. national or service
member.191 Federal criminal prosecution of officials could also be pursued
under the anti-torture provisions of the implementing legislation for the
CAT,192 which authorizes federal criminal prosecution of U.S. citizens who
commit torture abroad and of any perpetrator, regardless of nationality, who
is present in the United States.193
Military prosecution could be pursued under the U.S. Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which subjects any person found guilty of cruelty,
maltreatment, or maiming to punishment “as a court-martial may direct.”194
Finally, a torturer could be prosecuted by the international community.
The CAT obligates the international community to investigate and
prosecute cases of torture regardless of the victim’s nationality or where the
abuse occurred.195 Indeed, the international community has not only the
right, but the duty, to prosecute individuals guilty of torture: if the U.S. fails
to investigate and prosecute incidents of torture and other mistreatment,
then other countries must do so under the CAT and under the Third Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (which includes
an obligation to investigate and prosecute grave breaches).196
Despite these laws requiring the prosecution of individuals who have
committed torture, those responsible for torture—particularly high level
officials—frequently escape prosecution.197 A 2005 New Yorker article
described how in 2003, an Abu Ghraib prisoner named Manadel al-Jamadi
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died from asphyxiation during an interrogation.198 During the interrogation,
Manadel’s head was covered with a plastic bag and he was shackled in a
crucifixion-like pose that inhibited his ability to breathe.199 In a subsequent
internal investigation, U.S. government authorities classified Manadel’s
death as a “homicide.”200 Tragically, Mark Swanner, the C.I.A. officer who
conducted the interrogations, has not been charged with a crime and
continues to work for the agency.201 Moreover, the Times (London) noted
that after the initial Abu Ghraib photos surfaced in 2004, only “[n]ine
American soldiers—all low-ranking Reservists—[were] convicted in
connection with the abuse . . . .”202
Public outcry could affect the likelihood of federal criminal prosecutions
of torture; it has swayed prosecutorial decisions in the past. In 1991, after
television viewers nationwide witnessed several white Los Angeles police
officers brutally attack Rodney King, an African American man whom they
had pulled over for speeding, public outcry across the country prompted the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to launch a nationwide review of all police
brutality complaints in the past six years.203 Similarly, in the 1990s, public
opinion demanding increased environmental protection resulted in a
prosecutorial climate so charged that, as commentators noted, prosecutors
became highly incentivized to pursue environmental cases.204 Indeed,
Alberto Gonzales’s January 25, 2002, memo to the OLC expressed fear that
future prosecutors and independent counsels would prosecute ex-Bush
administration officials for violations of the War Crimes Act.205 He urged
President Bush to exempt the treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters
from the provisions of the Geneva Conventions,206 arguing that this
exemption would “create a reasonable basis in law that [the War Crimes
Act] does not apply, which would provide a solid defense to any future
prosecution.”207 Thus, public outcry against torture could lead to the
election of a new president whose administration would prosecute ex-Bush
officials.
Moreover, as Professor William Aceves stated:
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It took over twenty years before the efforts to prosecute Augusto
Pinochet were successful . . . . And, the impetus for prosecution
did not come from Chile; it came from the international
community. Similarly, establishing responsibility for the abuses
perpetrated at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo may not happen this
year (or even this decade). And it may not happen in the United
States. But if history serves as a guide, it will happen.208
Thus, as citizens of the international community, the U.S. public can bring
about the prosecution of torturers by supporting international prosecution
efforts.

VI. HOW CAN WE COUNTERACT THE TICKING TIME BOMB IN
TELEVISIONLAND?
Shows like 24 that portray torture under fictional circumstances can
perpetuate the already detrimental debate on torture by distorting the costs
and benefits of torture and making torture appear heroic and necessary. In
this section, I will briefly explore what organizations opposed to torture,
such as Amnesty International, can do to counteract the negative effects of
fictional portrayals of torture.
As Sontag notes, visual portrayals of atrocities become the
overgeneralized “maxim” that is recalled in the viewer’s mind when the
subject of torture arises.209 In order to counteract the maxim that 24 plants
in the viewer’s mind, another, more truthful conceptualization of torture
must take its place. Salon.com attempted to educate the American public
about the well-documented abuses that remain unprosecuted by releasing a
multitude of new photos of Abu Ghraib in 2006. These photographs failed
to arouse public reaction for two possible reasons. First, the public had seen
similar pictures in 2004, thus their capacity to respond to the images may
have been dulled. In Regarding the Pain of Others, Sontag notes that the
overabundance of images of atrocity has created a “culture of
spectatorship.”210 “For photographs to accuse, and possibly to alter
conduct, they must shock”;211 however, “shock can become familiar. Shock
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can wear off. . . . As one can become habituated to horror in real life, one
can become habituated to the horror of certain images.”212 Thus, it is quite
possible that the American public failed to respond to the new 2006 pictures
because they were no longer shocked that such abuse occurred at Abu
Ghraib. This lack of shock can potentially be attributed to the fact that
similar pictures had previously been released, coupled with the numbing
effect of watching countless instances of torture in TV dramas.213
Second, as discussed previously, pictures alone cannot mobilize viewers.
As Sontag noted, “[P]hotographs supply no evidence . . . for renouncing
war . . . . The destructiveness of war . . . is not in itself an argument against
waging war unless one thinks . . . that violence is always unjustifiable
. . . .”214 Pictures can fail to send a political message that challenges a
viewer’s current beliefs if the viewer does not know the context. Therefore,
the method of communication used to counteract the false and distorted
depictions of torture on shows like 24 must be, to some extent, shocking
and must communicate the appropriate context in which torture occurs.
Thus, I propose four possible ways of conveying such a message: (1)
televised disclaimers, (2) disclaimers on fan sites, (3) fictional or
documentary films, and (4) testimony by survivors.
A. Televised Disclaimers
One method of counteracting the negative effects of fictional portrayals
of torture on 24 would be to air a disclaimer after particularly torture-heavy
episodes. Although the Second Circuit has stated, “We are doubtful that a
few words could erase the indelible impression that is made by a television
broadcast, . . .”215 as one commentator noted, “All this [statement by the
Second Circuit] means is that it depends on the effectiveness of the
disclaimer; a large-text title card preceding the film would undoubtedly be
more effective than a small-text disclaimer buried in the closing credit
crawl.”216
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In the trademarks realm, courts and commentators have noted that
disclaimers are an effective means of communicating with television and
film viewers.217 One U.S. district court has stated: “To the extent that the
viewers of [the film] may have mistakenly believed that [plaintiff] was
associated with [it], the disclaimer, if it had been appropriately placed with
the credits, is an adequate means of alleviating the viewers’ confusion.”218
In examining how a director of a film that was originally produced in black
and white can “negat[e] the inference that the director of the original film is
in any way connected with the colorized version,” one commentator noted
that “[a]ny danger [of consumer confusion] confronting a colorizer could
easily be averted by an effective disclaimer.”219 Thus, a disclaimer to 24
could be an effective method of communicating the fictional nature of the
program, provided that the placement and content of the disclaimer were
carefully structured.
With respect to the placement of the disclaimer, in order to ensure that
viewers of 24 watch the disclaimer, it should be aired between the end of
the show and the trailer for the next episode. With respect to the content of
the disclaimer, one experiment conducted by a law professor suggests that
disclaimers displayed but not spoken have little effect in preventing
consumers from drawing misleading impressions.220 Thus, a spoken
disclaimer by Kiefer Sutherland, the executive producer and hero of 24, or
another actor familiar to the audience, would be the most effective means of
conveying the disclaimer. This spoken disclaimer would highlight the
differences between the portrayal of torture on television and torture in real
life. The disclaimer could also state Sutherland’s personal opinion that
torture by the government is unacceptable in real life.221
The disclaimer should also be crafted in narrative format. As Sontag has
stated, “a narrative seems more likely to be more effective than image.”222
Rather than merely stating, “The consequences of torture are much more
dire than this show would suggest,” Sutherland or another cast member
could briefly recount the story of a torture victim, outlining where the
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victim lived, how old the victim was, and what the victim’s life was like
once they escaped their captors.
Convincing Fox and the producers of 24 to include a disclaimer may be a
difficult task given that Fox is part of conservative Rupert Murdoch’s media
empire. Disclaimers would also reduce profitable advertising time.
However, as mentioned in Part V(A) supra, Kiefer Sutherland, the
executive producer and star of 24, does not personally believe in the use of
torture by the government and has stated this opinion on national
broadcasts.223 Thus, convincing 24’s producers to air such a disclaimer may
be possible.
B. Disclaimers on Fan Sites
Another method of communicating disclaimers, which would be cheaper
than buying advertising time during 24 and easier than convincing the
conservative Fox network to air an anti-torture message, would be to
include anti-torture messages on 24 fan Web sites. 24 fan Web sites offer
fan Weblogs, screen captures, image galleries, and episode transcripts for
24. In addition, some fan Web sites host “viewing parties,” which allow
viewers to chat online while viewing the show.224 As Jeff Alexander, the
creator of the fan Web site televisionwithoutpity.com notes, 24 is similar to
The X-Files in that its conspiracy-driven plotlines lend themselves to
“fevered speculation and discussion by fans.”225 Alexander also notes that
fan Web sites are popular because people like to try to poke holes in the
plot. 226
Fan Web sites receive tens and even hundreds of thousands of visitors.
As of October 8, 2007, 24addict.com’s site meter indicated that the site had
a total of 280,083 visitors since its inception,227 and 24weblog.com’s meter
indicated that it had 1,001,751 visitors since its inception.228 Unofficial fan
Web sites for 24 are even more popular than Fox’s official 24 Web site.229
Thus, organizations that wish to convey messages about the realities of
torture and its use by the current administration could either approach
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already existing 24 fan Web sites about displaying disclaimers or create
their own fan Web sites. These Web sites could be based on the traditional
24 fan site services, providing episode guides and chat forums in order to
draw 24 fans. The disclaimers on these Web sites could include narratives
written by victims of torture that detail their experiences with the torture
methods depicted on episodes of 24 and the effects of such torture. Fans
interested in poking holes in 24’s plots and noting inconsistencies might be
particularly interested in the vast differences between the post-torture lives
of real-life victims of torture and the fictional torture victims on 24. These
fans might also be interested in victims’ statements about the fact that
torturers are likely to obtain false information from desperate captives.
C. Fictional or Documentary Films
Organizations that oppose torture could also create fictional or
documentary films that portray torture in a realistic manner, highlighting
important issues such as whether the chances that a suspect has vital
information should affect a decision to torture. Sontag states that
[n]o photograph or portfolio of photographs can unfold, go
further, and further still, as do The Ascent (1977), . . . the most
affecting film about the sadness of war I know, and an astounding
Japanese documentary, . . . The Emperor’s Naked Army Marches
On (1987), the portrait of a “deranged” veteran of the Pacific war,
whose life’s work is denouncing Japanese war crimes from a sound
truck he drives through the streets of Tokyo . . . .230
In addition, the ability of well-crafted and provocative documentaries to,
at the very least, draw an audience was demonstrated by the popularity of
Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11.231 Thus, films could provide viewers
with a much more detailed understanding of torture practice than pictures or
disclaimers alone could, and moving to a new medium would capture
viewers’ attention. Through these documentaries, viewers would become
aware of the brutal consequences of torture and the fact that the ticking time
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bomb scenario bears little resemblance to real-world situations in which
torture is used.
D. Testimony by Survivors
Finally, another way to counter the deceptive portrayal of torture on
shows like 24 would be to encourage victims of torture to give public
testimony at churches, college campuses, and on television and radio talk
shows. Although at least 500,000 survivors of torture have taken refuge in
the United States,232 as the Washington Post has noted, “[f]ew Americans
will ever meet a survivor of torture, and many may find it almost impossible
to believe what they read about abuses committed by U.S. troops.”233
Through public appearances by survivors of torture, the American public,
which has become numbed to photographs of Abu Ghraib, will witness
torture in a distinctly different format. Rather than being blurry figures in a
photograph, victims will become mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters in
the eyes of the American public. Instead of conceptualizing torture as
something that happens to villains with knowledge of a ticking time bomb’s
whereabouts, the American public will learn that torture happens to
individuals such as the shy Afghan taxi driver who was choked in a hood
and forced to kiss his American captors’ boots, or the dignified police
officer whose American captors photographed him naked and twisted his
body like a pretzel.234

VII. CONCLUSION
Despite a multitude of laws prohibiting torture, documentary evidence
proves that torture occurs at the hands of Americans. The Bush
administration has failed to adhere to laws prohibiting torture and laws that
require the prosecution of torturers. However, as the repudiation of the
Bybee memo and the McCain Amendment demonstrate, the public has the
power to force the administration to take actions to narrow the gap between
torture law and practice.
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Unfortunately, the current debate on torture has been bewitched by the
unrealistic and impractical ticking time bomb hypothetical. Moreover, the
inadequacies of the current debate are reflected in and reinforced by
fictional portrayals of torture in shows like 24. Both the ticking time bomb
hypothetical and 24 pull the torture debate off course, cheat their way
around important and complex issues, and cause viewers to carry an
unrealistic portrait of torture in their minds. These negative effects are dire
because public awareness and mobilization are crucial to political change.
In order to counteract the dire effects of fictionalized portrayals of torture
on shows like 24, organizations opposed to the use of torture can attempt to
communicate a more realistic portrait of torture to the American public
through televised disclaimers, disclaimers on fan sites, fictional or
documentary films, and public testimony by survivors. Doing so hopefully
will foster a more realistic and productive public debate about the
consequences of torture and create an environment in which those guilty of
torture are held accountable.
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